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Abstract
The business model of many commercial TV-networks is to interrupt TV
programs with advertising breaks. In this paper we investigate consequences
of the fact that that today ad-averse viewers can adopt a technology which
enables them to skip advertising breaks. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we
nd that the ad-avoidance technology can make TV networks and advertisers
better o¤. The viewers as a group however, are always worse o¤when we take
into account their costs associated with adopting the technology.
Keywords: media economics, pricing ads, technology adoption.
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1 Introduction:
Many commercial broadcasters have two sources of revenue. They charge consumers
for watching TV and sell advertising time. The consumers dislike advertisements
however and try to avoid them, while the value of an ad to an advertiser increases
in the number of viewers to which the ad is exposed to. To internalize for this
averse relationship, TV networks have charged relatively low prices for watching
TV and tried to make it di¢ cult to avoid the ads by interrupting the programs by
advertising breaks. Today, however, there exists a technology which makes this
interruption strategy less e¤ective. By adopting a Digital Video Recorder (DVR)
viewers can now enjoy TV programs with only a small time delay, which enables
them to skip the ads when they come on. Some, for instance Gareld (2005), argue
that this may undermine the two-sided business model of TV networks. The aim of
this paper is therefore to investigate which consequences this technology may have
for TV networks, viewers and advertises.
Our point of departure is that the viewers are heterogeneous with respect to
advertising aversion; while some are very ad-averse others only slightly so. This
implies that a TV network must sacrice revenue from at least some [types of]
viewers. If it tries to capitalize on the least ad-averse by selling a lot of advertising,
the willingness to pay will be excessively low for the viewers who are relatively averse
to advertising. On the other hand, if the TV network represses the advertising level
in order to serve the highly averse viewers more e¢ ciently, the least averse viewers
will be very ine¢ ciently exploited. Our main point is that when the viewers can
adopt ad-avoidance technology by incurring a sunk cost, they will self-select into the
technology in such a way that the TV networks trade-o¤ becomes less pronounced.
An interesting implication from this is that a TV network may benet from the
consumers being able to adopt the DVR technology, and this may be so despite the
fact that fewer consumers as a consequence will be exposed to the ads that it sells.
Furthermore, and perhaps more surprisingly, we show that due to the TV networks
response, it is also perfectly possible that the DVR technology may make advertisers
2
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better o¤, while the viewers as a group will always be worse o¤.1
In order to see the intuition for these perhaps seemingly counterintuitive results,
note that a viewer can only avoid the ads if he is willing to incur the sunk cost
which is associated with adopting the technology. The consequence is therefore that
viewers who are highly averse to advertising will nd it worthwhile to adopt the
technology, whereas the least ad-averse viewers will not. This implies that when the
DVR technology is available, a TV network can increase the advertising level and
thereby exploit the least ad-averse viewers more e¢ ciently without fear of losing the
direct revenue with which the viewers who dislike advertising the most contribute.
In fact, we show that since the willingness to pay for watching TV increases for
the group that adopts the DVR technology, the TV network may nd it protable
to increase the price for watching and the advertising level simultaneously. If the
DVR penetration in equilibrium is su¢ ciently low, the positive e¤ects of a more
e¢ cient [higher] watching price and a more e¢ cient advertising level will dominate
the negative e¤ect of the advertising revenue foregone, due to the fact that DVR
adopters are shielded from advertising.
Since both the watching price and the intensity of ads will be dependent on the
DVR penetration, it follows that a marginal increase in the DVR penetration to
some degree will a¤ect all viewers. Thus, even though an adopter himself becomes
better o¤, it is not given that the consumers as group benet. In fact, we nd that
only when quite ad-averse viewers adopt the ad-avoidance technology, the adopters
gross private benet is su¢ ciently high to dominate the total negative externalities
the adopter imposes on the other viewers.2 Hence, as well as the TV networks prot,
the total consumer surplus is hump-shaped in the DVR penetration. Interestingly,
1This is an equilibrium result we obtain when allow the TV network to invest in program
quality. In this version of the paper however, the quality investments are removed for analytical
convenience. Thus, here we nd that when the viewers are worse o¤, the advertisers are worse o¤
as well. Nonetheless, we still nd that the advertisers and the viewers as a group can be better
o¤, if the DVR penetration is su¢ ciently low. The version with endogenous quality investments is
available from the author on request.
2The gross private benet is dened as the extra utility that the adopter obtains from watching
TV, hence the adopters private cost from adopting is not accounted for.
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the aggregate consumer surplus is maximized for a lower DVR penetration than that
which maximizes the TV networks prot.
When all viewers are exposed to advertising, the TV network sets a high adver-
tising price. This is partly done to internalize the advertiserswillingness to pay and
partly to repress the advertising level. Thus, since it is less necessary for the TV
network to repress the level of advertising when the most ad-averse viewers adopt
the DVR technology, the price of advertisements decreases more than to compensate
the advertisers for reaching fewer viewers. However, when the DVR penetration is
high, the TV network will nd it optimal to charge a high price for watching TV.
This increases the alternative cost of selling advertising such that once again the
TV network will charge a relatively high ad price in order to repress the ad level.
Eventually, the advertising price will therefore not decrease su¢ ciently to compen-
sate the advertisers for reaching fewer viewers. Thus, compared to when no viewer
has access to the DVR technology, also the advertisers are better o¤ if the DVR
penetration is low, and vice versa.
Whether or not a viewer buys a DVR is probably, apart from its price, determined
by the prices and levels of advertising of the full bundle of TV networks that he
consumes. Thus, since we are interested in the actions of just one TV network, it
seems reasonable to treat the DVR penetration as an exogenous variable, which is
what we do in the main section of the paper. However, in order to close the model,
we make an extension where the DVR penetration is endogenized. This is done by
opening up for forward-looking consumers to buy DVRs from a monopolist, prior
to watching TV. When we take into account the sunk cost that is incurred when
adopting the technology, the aggregate consumer surplus is always lower than when
the technology is not available.
The fact that consumers dislike ads on TV is incorporated in most models that
analyze the broadcasting industry, see for instance Choi (2006), Armstrong &Weeds
(2007) and Kind. et al. (2009). However, even though viewers have always tried to
avoid the advertisements, for instance by going to the bathroom, this behavior has
received surprisingly little attention. To our knowledge, such behavior is in general
terms only discussed by Stühmeier & Wenzel (2011). However, their model does not
4
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capture the very specics of the DVR technology, i.e. that a viewer by incurring a
sunk cost can avoid all advertisements at zero marginal cost. Two papers that do
capture these specics are Wilbur (2008a) and Anderson & Gans (2011).
Whereas Wilbur only discusses in general terms how the DVR technology may
help TV networks to measure ad-avoidance behavior, Anderson & Gans (henceforth
A&G) set up a formal model inspired by the seminal work of Anderson & Coate
(2005). With this model, they elegantly analyze several questions related to the DVR
technology. For instance they show, as we do, that the level of advertising increases
in the DVR penetration., a nding which is in accordance with the empirical results
of Wilbur (2008b). Our paper di¤ers however by the fact that their model does not
capture the following relationship; the less averse to advertising a viewer is, the more
TV programs he watches and therefore the more advertising revenue he generates. 3
This minor di¤erence seems to translate into quite di¤erent qualitative ndings. For
instance, we nd that the prot of a TV network is maximized for an intermediate
degree of DVR penetration, while they nd that the prot always decreases in the
DVR penetration.4 Furthermore, we nd that all groups of agents are better of
when the most ad-averse viewers adopt the DVR technology, while A&G nd that
the total social surplus decreases, even when the penetration increases from zero.5
It is also worth noting that some ndings of Tåg (2009) are related to our nd-
ings. He shows that an online media rm will choose to increase the ad intensity
of a free service if it launches a clone which is free of advertising but which the
consumers must pay to consume. On the surface his result is therefore somewhat
similar to ours which states that when the viewers adopt ad-avoidance technology,
the price for watching and the advertising level may increase simultaneously. The
3In A&Gs model, it is less likely that a viewer will subscribe to the TV network the more averse
towards advertising he is, but all viewers who choose to subscribe and are exposed to advertising,
generate equally much advertising revenue.
4A&G focus mainly on free-to-air TV, but also discuss subscription based fees. Some of their
ndings about the fees coincide with our ndings. However, their conclusion that the prot of the
TV-network decreases in the PVR adoption applies also when they consider subscription payments,
which contradicts our nding.
5They emphasize that this is a local result and not necessarily a global one.
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driving mechanisms of our results are nevertheless quite di¤erent from those of Tåg.
The intuition for his results is that when having a premium service in addition to
the free service, the media rm has an incentive to increase the advertising level
in order to increase advertising averse consumerswillingness to pay for the pre-
mium service. However, in contrast to the [online] media rm, the TV network
in our model provides only one service. It is not possible for the TV network to
discriminate between the viewers that are and the viewers that are not exposed to
advertising. Furthermore, we assume that a TV network alone cannot a¤ect the
DVR penetration.
In order to model viewers consumption decisions in a convenient fashion, we
assume that TV-programs are sold at pay-per-view. This approach is also applied
in Kind et al. (2009) and Bergh et al. (2012). The assumption should however not
restrict our results from being valid also when TV networks charge a subscription
fee, inasmuch as the driving mechanism is that the DVR technology separates more
ad-averse viewers from those that are less ad-averse. Hence, also when the business
model is subscription based, the DVR technology opens for the possibility that both
groups of viewers can be served more e¢ ciently. The results may in fact be stronger
since highly ad-averse viewers may choose to subscribe to the TV network only if
they do have a DVR, i.e. there might be a market expansion e¤ect when subscription
fees are charged.
The remainder of the text is organized as follows. In the next section we derive
the TV-networks response to an exogenous DVR penetration and consider how the
di¤erent agents are a¤ected by the availability of the technology. We then endogenize
the DVR penetration in the third section, while in the forth section we make some
concluding remarks and discuss further research. All proofs and non-crucial algebra
are relegated to the appendix.
2 The basic model:
Consider a TV-network which serves advertisers and viewers. Assume that the
TV network provides a mass of heterogenous TV programs, normalized to unity.
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Further, assume that there is a mass of viewers, also normalized to unity, who are
heterogeneous with respect to advertising aversion. A viewer watches the c 2 [0; 1]
programs he prefers the most. In order to capture that the viewersmarginal utility
of TV consumption is decreasing, we assume that the gross utility a viewer obtains
from the cth program he watches is 1  c.6 If we treat the number of programs as
a continuous variable, a viewers gross utility (u) from watching TV c programs is:
u =
Z c
0
(1  c) dc  c (1  c=2) :
Whenever a viewer watches a program, he is charged a price p. If he is exposed
to advertisements, he incurs a non-pecuniary cost of A in addition, where A is
the number of advertisements that the program contains and  is his disutility of
having to watch an advertisement.7 We assume that  is uniformly distributed, i.e.
  U [ ; 1 +  ] where 0 <  < 1=2 is the disutility for the viewer that dislikes
advertising the least.8 Thus, if a viewer of type  is exposed to advertising, the
generalized price he faces for watching a TV program is p+ A. In order to simplify
the analysis we assume that the viewerstaste in programs is uniformly distributed
and independent of . Since there by denition is no correlation between a viewers
aversion to advertising and which programs he prefers, the ex-ante demand for all
programs is equal. Thus, there is no incentive for Ramsey type strategies. It is
in other words optimal for the TV network to set the same price and the same
advertising level for all programs. If the TV network sells A advertisements, each
program will contain A advertisements. The net utility (U) of a representative type
 viewer that is exposed to advertisements is then:
U = u  (p+ A) c:
6Decreasing marginal utility can stem from the consumers watching the programs they like the
best rst, or simply because the viewers have an alternative cost of time.
7By assuming that the cost of watching advertisements for a viewer is linear in the number
of advertisements to which he is exposed, we simplify the algebra. If we open for this cost to
be convex, the result will be less advertising in equilibrium, but it will not a¤ect the qualitative
results.
8If no viewer owns a DVR and  > 1=2 , the TV network chooses not to sell advertising. For
further details, see the advertisersprot expression below.
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By solving the viewers F.O.C. (@U=@c = 0) we obtain the individual program
demand:
c = 1  p  A:
However, if the viewer has a DVR, he will not be exposed to any advertisements.
Thus, he will behave as if  = 0. The utility of a DVR owner is then U=0 and his
demand for TV-programs is consequently:9
c = 1  p:
Assumption 1: The  2 [0; 1] most ad-averse viewers have DVRs.
In the next section we derive that if any viewer buys a DVR, it is the viewers
that are most averse to advertising who do so. In this section, we therefore assume
this to hold.10 By assumption 2, the total program demand from the viewers that
are exposed to advertising is:
D1 =
Z +(1 )

cd:
Since all viewers that own a DVR will watch the same number of programs, the
total program demand from the DVR owners is:
D2 = c:
The aggregate demand for programs is then:
D  D1 +D2 = (1  p)  (1  ) (1 + 2   )A=2: (1)
We assume that there are N advertisers, who all have an expected benet equal
to 1 from exposing a viewer to a message. For simplicity we assume this benet to be
9For convenience, we drop subscript  = 0
10The assumption can easily be justied inasmuch as that the ones who dislike advertising the
most, are also the ones who are willing to pay the most to get rid of it, all else equal.
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independent of whether a viewer has previously been exposed to the same message.11
Thus, an advertisers gross benet of posting an advertisement in a TV program is
solely determined by the number of non-adopters watching the program. Since there
is a unit mass of programs and each viewer that is exposed to advertising watches
c programs, the probability for a given viewer to be exposed to an ad posted in
a given program is simply f(c) = c. The total number of viewers to which an
advertisement is exposed is then F =
R +(1 )

f(c)d = D1. An advertisers net
benet from buying an ad is therefore D1   r. Thus, if advertiser n buys An ads,
its net benet equals:
Bn = (D1   r)An: (2)
In order to derive the demand for advertisements, write A =
P
i6=nAi + An, and
solve advertiser ns F.O.C. (@Bn=An = 0), in order to obtain:
An =
1
(1  ) (1   + 2) 
(1  )(1  p)  r  
X
i6=n
Ai

1
2
(1 + 2) + (1  )   
!
:
If we now impose symmetry, (N   1)An can be substituted for
P
i6=nAi. By solving
for An and then aggregating up for N = 1, aggregate demand for ads becomes:
A =
(1  p)  r=(1  )
(1   + 2) : (3)
When p increases, each viewer watches fewer programs. Thus, the number of viewers
that watch a given program decreases in p, which implies that an ad is exposed
to fewer viewers. The advertisersbenet from buying ads therefore decreases in
11This assumption can be justied by the fact that every time a viewer is exposed to an ad-
vertisement, there is a positive probability that he will respond like the advertiser aims him to
respond. Whether this probability is increasing or decreasing in the number of times he is exposed
to the message is an empirical question. Thus, we assume that the probability is constant. Our
assumption is di¤erent from that of Anderson and Gans (2011), who assume that one single ad is
su¢ cient to reach all viewers and that there is no e¤ect of the second advertisement.
9
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p, which in turn translates into lower demand for ads. Since the advertisersnet
benet from buying ads also decreases in the ad price, the demand for ads decreases
in r as well. The demand for advertisements also decreases in  . This is because an
increase in  shifts the distribution of advertising aversion upwards, such that each
viewer who is exposed to advertising watches fewer TV programs, all else equal.
An increase in  has two opposing e¤ects on the advertising demand. Since the
expected number of viewers reached by an advertisement decreases, the e¤ective
price for reaching a consumer with an ad increases (r=(1   )). However, since it
is the viewers who are at the margin most averse towards advertising that become
shielded from advertising, each ad will displace disproportionately less consumption
of TV programs when  increases. This translates into a positive indirect e¤ect on
the advertising demand, inasmuch as the marginal ad an advertiser buys decreases
the value of its inframarginal ad to a lower degree.
In the discussion below we distinguish between the revenue that the TV-network
extracts from the viewer side (Dr) and the advertiser side of the market (Ar). For
simplicity we assume that costumers at both sides are served at zero marginal cost.
Hence the TV-networks prot () can be expressed as:
 = Dp+ Ar: (4)
where D(p; ; A) is given by Eq. (1) and A = A(p; r; ) is given by Eq. (3).
The TV-networks optimal price structure for a given DVR penetration is derived
by solving F.O.C.s with respect to prices (@=@p = @=@r = 0). Before we solve
for the equilibrium prices, it is instructive to consider the two F.O.C.s separately.
The F.O.C. with respect to the program price (@=@p = 0) can be expressed as:
@
@p
=
@D
@p
p+D +
@D1
@A
@A
@p
p+
@A
@p
r = 0: (5)
Eq. (5) shows how the prot for the TV network changes if it increases the program
price marginally, while the ad price is kept constant. The two rst terms are stan-
dard; higher margin on the sales but less sales. The third term captures that the
viewers who are exposed to advertising are less sensitive to a price increase than the
viewers who are not. The explanation is that the advertising demand decreases in p,
10
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which implies that the generalized price for the viewers who are exposed to advertis-
ing increases less than the monetary price. Finally, the last term captures the fact
that since the advertising demand decreases in p, the revenue from the advertiser
side of the market decreases as well. Thus, the higher the advertising price and the
more advertising sales that are foregone when the price of programs is increased,
the higher is the alternative cost of increasing the program price.
The F.O.C. with respect to the advertising price (@=@r = 0) can be expressed
as:
@
@r
=
@A
@r
r + A+
@D1
@A
@A
@r
p = 0: (6)
Eq. (6) shows how the prot for the TV network changes if it increases the ad
price marginally, while the program price is kept constant. Once again, the two rst
terms capture that a higher price means a higher margin, but also less sales. The
last term captures how a higher advertising price a¤ects the revenue from the viewer
side of the market. Since a higher ad price translates fewer ads sold, the demand for
programs and thereby the revenues from the viewer side increases in the ad price.
Thus, the more the sales of programs increase and the higher the program price, the
higher the alternative cost of increasing the ad sales, i.e. reducing the advertising
price.
Lemma 1: Since the TV network serves both viewers and advertisers, there is
an alternative cost of;
a) increasing the mark-up on the programs, in terms of lower advertising rev-
enue, and;
b) decreasing the mark-up on the ads, in terms of lower revenue from the viewer
side.
In the appendix we solve the system of equations dened by Eqs (5) and (6).
This gives:
11
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p = p(; ) @p=@ > 0
@p=@ < 0 in  2 [0; ()]
@p=@ > 0 in  2 [(); 1]
where () > 0 if  > 1=6
r = r(; ) @r=@ > 0 @r=@ < 0
A = A(; ) A=@ < 0 @A=@ > 0
Table 1; Equilibrium Values / Comparative Statics
Proposition 1: The optimal prices depend on the distribution of aversion to-
wards advertising ( ) and the DVR penetration ( ) where;
a) both the advertising price ( r) and the program price ( p) increase in  , and;
b) the advertising price decreases in , while;
c) the program price increases in  if  < 1=6 and is otherwise u-shaped in ,
with a maximum at  = 1:
When we discuss the intuition for Proposition 1, it is useful to bear in mind
that the TV-network serves (1   ) viewers who are heterogenous with respect to
advertising aversion and  viewers who are not exposed to advertising at all. This
means that with only one set of prices, it is impossible to extract the full potential
value of each viewer.12 When maximizing the prot, the TV network will therefore
assign weight to the di¤erent viewers based on how protable they are. The least
advertising averse viewers are the most protable, and relatively more so the smaller
 is. This implies that the lower  , the closer the price and advertising level will
be to the levels that maximize the value of the type  viewer. On the other hand
however, the further away the price and advertising level will be from the levels that
maximize the value of the most ad-averse viewers who are exposed to advertising
and those viewers who are not exposed to advertising.
An increase in  shifts the distribution of advertising aversion upwards such
that more program demand is displaced per ad sold. The consequence is that the
advertisersdemand for advertising decreases, while the TV networks alternative
12There exist a price p() and an advertising price r(), with a corresponding advertising level
A(), that maximize the value of a type  viewer, where @p()=@ > 0, @r()=@ < 0 and
@A()=@ < 0. Furthermore, when   , it is optimal to set A = 0:
12
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cost of selling ads increases, in  . The latter e¤ect is the most pronounced, so
the TV network responds by increasing a higher price of advertisements. When it
becomes less protable to sell ads, we know from Lemma 1 that the alternative cost
of setting a high program price decreases. Thus, the price of watching TV programs
will increase in  . An alternative intuition is that since the TV-network sells fewer
ads, the demand for programs will be higher, which in turn calls for a higher program
price.
An increase in  implies that the most ad-averse viewers among the viewers who
are exposed to advertising, become shielded from advertising. This has two e¤ects;
each ad is exposed to fewer viewers and each ad decreases the demand for programs
disproportionately less. The former e¤ect implies that the advertiserswillingness
to pay for each ad decreases. The latter e¤ect, however, increases the TV networks
incentive to sell ads, since it decreases the alternative cost of selling ads. From
Table 1 we see that it is the latter e¤ect which dominates, inasmuch as a higher 
translates into a lower advertising price and a higher advertising level.
Since each viewer watches more TV when he has a DVR, the demand for TV pro-
grams increases in . Furthermore, since a higher  means that the loss of program
demand, which is relevant for the advertising demand, is lower, the alternative cost
of setting a high program price decreases in . Both e¤ects contribute to a higher
program price, all else equal. However, inasmuch as the TV networks alternative
cost of selling ads also decreases in , there is one e¤ect which works in the oppo-
site direction. This is the fact that each viewer who is still exposed to advertising
becomes more valuable, so these viewers will be assigned more weight. Since, in
isolation, the revenue from serving these viewers is maximized for a rather low pro-
gram price, this e¤ect contributes to a lower program price, all else equal. Whether
the program price increases or decreases in  will consequently be determined by
the interaction between the three e¤ects.13
In order to see how these e¤ects interact, suppose that all viewers are exposed
to advertising, i.e.  = 0. When  is high, there are now two e¤ects that contribute
to the level of advertising being lower than when  is low; overall the viewers are
13This result is related to Proposition 9 in Anderson and Gans (2011).
13
SNF Working Paper No 17/12
more averse to advertising and the most ad-averse subset is assigned more weight.
The implication of the latter e¤ect is the following; the higher  , the more revenue
is sacriced from the viewers in the least ad-averse subset [in order to sustain the
revenue from the viewers in the most ad-averse subset]. From this it follows that
the value of the viewers in the least ad-averse subset increases more in  the higher
 , since there is no need to repress the advertising level in order to cater for the
most ad-averse viewers when these have DVRs. In other words, the e¤ect which
contributes to a lower program price is stronger the higher  .
Another consequence of the most ad-averse subset being assigned more weight is
that their consumption prior to the adoption of the DVR technology will be closer
to their consumption after adoption, i.e. the consumption e¤ect will be smaller.
Hence, the two e¤ects that force the program price upwards are weaker and the
e¤ect that pushes the price downwards is stronger the higher  : If  is su¢ ciently
high, the program price therefore decreases in  around  = 0. Nevertheless, when
 increases, the alternative cost of setting a high price becomes very low. The
explanation is since few viewers are exposed to the ads, the total loss of program
consumption relevant for the advertising demand is low when  is high. Thus, the
program price will therefore eventually increase in  always be maximized for  = 1.
By substituting the equilibrium prices into the prot expression given by Eq. (4)
we obtain:
(;  ) = 2 ( + 1) (2    + 1)Z
where Z = Z(; ) @=@ < 0
@=@ j=0> 0
@=@ j=1< 0
14
Table 2; Equilibrium Prot /Comparative Statics
If we plot (;  ; q) for  = 0:05 (solid line) and  = 0:3 (dashed line), we
obtain:
14Z(;  ; q) is dened in the appendix
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Proposition 2: There exists a TV () which maximizes the prot of the TV
network, such that ;
a) the prot is hump-shaped in  with a minimum at  = 1, and;
b) both the maximum prot level and the DVR penetration which maximizes the
prot, decrease in  (@(TV )=@ < 0 and @TV =@ < 0).
The rst part of proposition 2 gives the main message of the paper; if the TV
network responds optimally, its prot will be maximized for an intermediate DVR
penetration. The intuition for this result follows from three e¤ects that impact the
TV-networks prot when the marginal viewer who is exposed to advertising adopts
the DVR technology. The rst e¤ect is that the adopters TV consumption will
no longer generate advertising revenue, an e¤ect which impacts the TV networks
prot in a negative direction. However, the second e¤ect is that the adopter will
watch more TV and hence he will contribute to more revenue at the viewer side.15
The third and nal e¤ect is that the protability of the viewers who remain exposed
to advertising will increase. The explanation is that the alternative cost of selling
15If the TV-network is nanced by a subscription-based fee, this is equivalent to an increase in
the adopters willingness to pay for the TV network. Hence, the TV network can increase the
subscription fee without losing the viewer, i.e. set the subscription fee such that the new marginal
viewer [that is exposed to advertising] is indi¤erent between subscribing and not subscribing.
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advertising decreases since it is the viewer that is at the margin most averse to
advertising who now becomes shielded from advertising.16 Since the two latter
e¤ects impact the TV networks prot in a positive direction, its prot increases
in  when the two latter e¤ects dominate the advertising revenue with which the
adopter would have contributed.
A low  implies that the marginal viewer is quite averse to advertising. Hence,
prior to adoption of the DVR technology, the viewer watches less TV, and his pres-
ence among the viewers that are exposed to advertising restricts the optimal adver-
tising level more, the lower . All else equal, the positive e¤ects from a viewers
adoption of the technology are therefore stronger, while the loss of advertising rev-
enue is smaller, the more ad-averse the viewer is. This explains why the TV networks
prot increases most when  is low. Furthermore, since one viewers adoption in-
creases the protability of the non-adopters, the loss of advertising revenue increases
convexly in . Together with the fact that the positive e¤ects decrease in , and
that the prot will be lower when all viewers have adopted the DVR technology than
when no viewer has done so, we know that the TV networks prot must decrease
steeply in  when it approaches 1.
The more averse to advertising a viewer is, the less protable it is for the TV
network to serve him. Since the viewers overall are more ad-averse the higher  , it
is straight forward that the prot level of the TV network decrases in  . However,
a higher  also means that the viewers are a more homogenous with respect to
advertising aversion. This implies that for the TV network, the [absolute] gain from
the most ad-averse viewers being shielded from advertising is lower. Hence, when 
is high, a TV network prefers a lower DVR penetration than when  is low.
We have now considered how a TV network should optimally respond to an
exogenous DVR penetration and how its prot is a¤ected when it does so. Let us
now consider how the TV-networks costumers are a¤ected by the technology and the
TV networks response. The advertisersprot is simply obtained by substituting
into Eq. (2) for the equilibrium values from Table 1. The aggregate consumer
16The TV network has no longer a marginal incentive to repress the advertising level in order to
maintain the program demand of the adopter.
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surplus from TV consumption is obtained by substituting into Eq. (7) below for the
values from Table 1:17
CS = U=0 +
Z +(1 )

Ud (7)
Proposition 3: There exists a CS() which maximizes the aggregate consumer
surplus and a B() which maximizes the advertisersprot, such that;
a) both aggregate consumer surplus and the advertisersprot are hump-shaped
in , with a minimum at  = 1, and;
b) the advertisers prot is maximized for a lower DVR penetration than the
aggregate consumer surplus, which in turn is maximized for a lower DVR penetration
than the TV networks prot i.e. 0 < B < CS < TV < 1, and;
c) all levels decrease in  .
In order to see the intuition for the consumer surplus part of Proposition 3,
consider the situation where all viewers are exposed to advertising. Since the TV
network now faces a demand for advertisements, its prot margin of selling TV pro-
grams is higher than when all viewers own DVRs. In order to boost the demand for
TV programs, the TV network therefore sets a relatively low price on TV programs.
The low price more than compensates the viewers as a whole for the aggregate disu-
tility associated with the advertisements. However, for viewers that are relatively
ad-averse, the disutility from the advertisements outweighs the benet of the lower
program price.
Suppose now that the most ad-averse viewer adopts the DVR technology. Since
the program price will be lower than when the TV network does not sell advertising
at all, the adopter will now be better o¤ as well. Nonetheless, price and advertising
level always change to such a degree that the total e¤ect on the other viewers is
negative. Due to this negative externality, it is not given that the consumer surplus
increases in . We nd the private benet to dominate the negative externality
when highly ad-averse viewers adopt ad-avoidance technology, but not when mod-
estly ad-adverse viewers adopt. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we nd that the
17Note that we do not take into account the costs of adopting the DVRs.
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total consumer surplus is maximized for a lower DVR penetration than the DVR
penetration that which maximizes TV networks prot.
The lower  , the more protable it is for the TV network to boost TV con-
sumption by setting a low program price. This price e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong to
dominate the fact that the advertising level decreases in  as well, so hence the
aggregate consumer surplus decreases in  .
It is perhaps somewhat surprising that the advertisersprot is maximized for
a positive DVR penetration, inasmuch as a positive DVR penetration implies that
some viewers are not reached by the advertisements. The intuition is that when
all consumers are exposed to advertising, the TV network sets a high price for two
reasons; to internalize the advertiserswillingness to pay and to internalize that
some viewers are very averse towards advertising. However, when the most ad-
averse viewers adopt the DVR technology, the latter incentive for charging a high
ad price vanishes. The consequence is therefore that when the DVR penetration
increases from a low level, the advertising price decreases more than to compensate
the advertisers for reaching fewer viewers. Nevertheless, when the DVR penetration
is high, the price of TV programs is high as well. This increases the alternative
cost of selling advertisements, and gives the TV network a renewed incentive to
marginally repress the advertising level by setting a high ad price. Thus, when the
DVR penetration increases from a relatively high level, the lower advertising price
will no longer fully compensate the advertisers for reaching fewer viewers. Hence,
when the DVR penetration becomes su¢ ciently high, the advertisersprot starts
to decrease in the DVR penetration.
From our results so far, it follows that:
Proposition 4: The social surplus is maximized for a positive DVR penetra-
tion.
Proposition 4 summarizes Propositions 1-3. The result is straight forward, since
the TV network, the advertisers, and the viewers as a group, are all better o¤
for a low DVR penetration. The reason why everyone can be better o¤ at the
same time is that the DVR technology serves as an discriminatory device which
18
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the viewers self-select into. Thus, the DVR technology separates less from more
ad-averse viewers and therefore enables the TV network to serve both the least and
the most ad-averse subset more e¢ ciently. This benets the TV network, but also
the advertisers, since the TV network represses the level of advertising by setting a
ad high price. Furthermore, the viewers as a group are better o¤ since the private
benet of the adopters in sum exceeds the negative externalities that are imposed on
the non-adopters. However, if su¢ ciently many viewers adopt the technology, also
viewers who would have been served more e¢ ciently in the group which is exposed
to advertising will be shielded from it. The social surplus decreases in the DVR
penetration from the point where "too many" viewers are shielded from advertising.
The explanation is that the fewer viewers that are exposed to advertising, the higher
the prices of both programs and ads, such that when the DVR penetration is high,
both the aggregate consumption of TV programs and the sales of ads are excessively
low.
3 Extension: Endogenous DVR Penetration
In the previous section we derived a TV networks optimal price structure for an
exogenous DVR penetration. We argued that this seemed reasonable, inasmuch as
whether or not a viewer adopts the DVR technology is probably inuenced by the
price and advertising level of a number of TV networks. However, it is interesting
to study how the joint actions of TV networks a¤ect the DVR penetration, since
the DVR penetration in turn determines the TV networksprot. To do this, we
open up for viewers being able to buy DVRs prior to watching TV. There are two
reasons why this seems like a reasonable approach. First, even though the DVR
penetration may change over time, it is probably quite stable from day to day.
Hence, both the TV networks and the advertisers should be well informed about the
current DVR penetration when they make their decisions. Second, after adoption
of the technology a viewer will be shielded from advertising regardless what the TV
network does, while the TV network in principle can change its prices from day to
19
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day.
For simplicity we assume that the monopoly TV network is in fact a mass of small
TV networks, which set prices like the monopolist TV network described above. We
can do this without loss of generality if we split the mass of TV programs between
di¤erent TV networks and assume that the TV programs are su¢ ciently di¤erenti-
ated such that the viewers perceive them as being independent products.18 ;19. Thus,
we continue with U being the utility of the bundle of TV networks for a viewer of
type  .20 If a viewer chooses to adopt the DVR technology, however, he will obtain
utility U=0 from consuming TV programs, but then in addition he must pay the
price of the DVR technology (P ).21 A viewer of type  therefore adopts the DVR
technology if:
U(; )=0   P  U(; )
or:
P  (U=0(; )  U(; )) (8)
When inequality (8) holds with equality, it gives the maximum a type  viewer is
willing to to pay in order to adopt the DVR technology. Since @U=@ < 0 it follows
immediately from inequality (8) that the more averse a viewer is, the more likely it
is that he adopts the DVR technology. Hence, Assumption 2 holds.
A viewers utility of adopting the DVR technology is dependent of . At this
stage, however the value of  is not yet determined. A viewer must therefore have
an expectation about  in order to calculate whether it is worthwhile for him to pay
18Assume that U =
P1
i=0 (ci(1  ci=2)  (pi +Ai))  b
Q1
i=0 ci where i is TV network i.
19All qualitative results in the main section hold when di¤erentiated TVnetworks compete.
However, the program price level and the advertising level of each TV network are lower, and more
so the closer substitutes the TV networks being.
20It is not clear how the number of TV networks a¤ects a consumers surplus. More TV networks
mean lower prices and less advertising on each network, which benets the viewres. However,
when the TV networks are substitutes, the utility of a TV-network is lower than the utility of the
monopoly TV network, all else equal. Thus, we assume here that the two e¤ects perfectly counter
each other such that a viewers utility can be expressed as U:
21A viewer that has adopted the PVR technology will not be exposed to advertising, hence his
utility is as if he were type  = 0:
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P in order to adopt a DVR. We therefore assume that the viewers are rational and
able to form [correct] expectations about , by observing the DVR price and having
information about the distribution of advertising aversion () and the TV-networks
pricing strategies. For the marginal adopter inequality (8) must hold with equality.
Thus, when  viewers adopt the DVR technology, the marginal adopter is identied
by ^ =  + 1  . By substituting ^ into inequality (8), we obtain the highest price
for which  viewers will buy the DVR as a function of the viewersexpectations
and the aversion parameter  . If we now plot Eq. (8) for  = 0:05 (solid line) and
 = 0:35 (dashed line), we obtain:22
Figure 2 needs some explanation. The graphs show the maximum the  most
ad-averse viewer is willing to pay for adopting the DVR technology, given that he
is the most ad-averse non-adopter. The point where the graphs meet the price-axis
is therefore the maximum the most ad-averse viewer is willing to pay, given that he
expects no other viewer to adopt. The next point to the right then becomes the
maximum the second most ad-averse viewer is willing to pay, given that he expects
the most ad-averse viewer to adopt, and so on. For this reason, it may seem counter
intuitive that the price is hump-shaped. However, this is due to the TV networks
22We refer to Eq (8) when inequality (8) holds with equality.
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responses. As the DVR penetration increases, the program price changes and the
advertising level increases. These changes a¤ect the utility of adopting the DVR
technology. Hence, the marginal adopters willingness to pay is determined by his
aversion towards advertising and how the TV networks set prices, given the current
DVR penetration. Initially the response increases the value of adoption su¢ ciently
to dominate the fact that the [next] marginal viewer is more adaverse. However,
since the program price increases in the DVR penetration, the utility of adopting the
DVR technology decreases in , all else equal. Thus, when  becomes su¢ ciently
high, the price e¤ect in combination with the marginal non-adopter being less averse
to advertising when  is high, dominate the fact that the advertising level increases
in . Hence, when the DVR penetration is high, the DVR price have to be reduced
quite signicantly in order to convince the [next] marginal viewer to adopt. This
explains the steep fall in P when  is close to 1.
From Figure 2 we can conclude that the willingness to pay for the DVR tech-
nology is high when the level of advertising aversion is low, and vice versa. This
may seem counterintuitive, but the intuition follows from the TV networks pricing
strategy. When advertising aversion is low, the TV networks set low program prices
and sell lots of advertising compared to when  is high. This makes it very benecial
for the viewers to be able to avoid the ads, which in turn makes their willingness to
pay for the DVR technology decreasing in  :
Lemma 4: For a given DVR price, the DVR penetration decreases in the level
of advertising aversion ( ).
If the DVR technology is supplied by a competitive industry, it will be available
at marginal cost. Hence, the DVR penetration will be pinned down by the marginal
cost. In this section we assume however that the DVR technology is supplied by a
monopoly seller. This is done in order to capture what is also discussed in Anderson
and Gans (2011), namely that a strategic DVR seller will exploit the fact that the
viewers anticipate the TV networks behavior. For simplicity, we normalize the
marginal cost to zero, such that the prot of the DVR supplier is:
  = P: (9)
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In order to solve the DVR suppliers maximization problem analytically, we need
to x a value for  . We therefore derive the optimal DVR price for a low (0:05),
an intermediate (0:2) and a high (0:35) value of  . The maximization strategy we
apply is to nd , i.e. the  that maximizes Eq. (9) given that the price is set in
accordance with Eq. (8) and the viewersexpectations are correct in equilibrium.
The optimal price of the DVR is then obtained by substituting  back into Eq. (8).
From the hump shapes of the graphs depicted in Figure 2 it is clear that some
prices belong to three equilibria. In order to see this, pick any price which is higher
than the most ad-averse viewers willingness to pay and lower than the highest price
that gives positive sales when the expectations of the viewers are correct. Any
such price intersects the graph in two points. Hence, both points are equilibrium
candidates for the given price. Furthermore, since the price is higher than what the
most ad-averse viewer is willing to pay if he expects no other viewer to adopt, zero
DVR sale is also an equilibrium candidate. In such cases, the viewersexpectations
determine which equilibrium that is realized. In order to rene the set of equilibria,
we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 2: If a viewer regrets having bought the DVR when the adver-
tising level and the program price are realized, he can return the DVR to the seller
and get a full price refund.23
For a given price, the DVR seller always prefers the equilibrium which gives
the highest DVR penetration. Under Assumption 4, this equilibrium will always be
played. The reason is that since the viewers can return the DVRs, buying is a weakly
dominating strategy for all viewers that are more ad-averse than  = 1 +    .24
23This strategy is easy to implement and it is frequently applied by sellers of durable goods.
24Pick a viewer type on the interval  2 [1 +    ; 1 +  ]. If he buys the DVR and he is the
marginal viewer, he is indi¤erent between keeping and returning the DVR. If he is among the
inframarginal adopters, i.e. to the left of the marginal viewer, he is better o¤ by keeping the DVR.
Finally, no viewer who is located to the right of the marginal viewer when the equilibrium preferred
by the DVR seller is played, has incentives to buy the DVR technology.
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However, for a viewer that is less ad-averse, not buying is a weakly dominating
strategy. This implies that at the stage where the TV networks set prices and
advertising levels,  viewers are shielded from advertising. Since the DVR price
is set in order to make viewer type  = 1 +     indi¤erent between buying and
not buying, the marginal DVR adopter is consequently indi¤erent between keeping
and returning the DVR. Furthermore, all viewers who are more ad-averse than the
marginal adopter, are better o¤ by keeping the DVR, while no non-adopter regrets
being a non-adopter. Hence, the intended equilibrium is realized and in equilibrium
no viewer ever returns the DVR.25
Lemma 5: The DVR price decreases, while the DVR penetration increases in
the aversion level, i.e. @P=@ < 0 and @=@ > 0.
The intuition for the rst part of Lemma 5 is straight forward. When the aversion
level is low, the DVR supplier exploits that the viewerswillingness to pay is high.
Hence, it sets a high price. However, the lower  , the more heterogenous the viewers,
i.e. the greater the di¤erence in willingness to pay for the DVR . This implies that in
the interval where the optimal DVR price decreases, the DVR price must be reduced
more in order to convince the next marginal viewer to adopt, all else equal. In other
words, the [relative] marginal revenue of the DVR seller decreases in  , which makes
the optimal DVR penetration decreasing in  as well.
We can now consider how the agents of the model are a¤ected by the fact that
the DVR technology is made available by a strategic monopolist. The consumer
surplus that takes into account the cost of adopting the DVR technology is given
by Eq. (10) below, while there is no change in the prot expressions for the rms:
CS =  (U=0   P (; )) +
Z +(1 )

Ud (10)
If we substitute for  into Eq. (10), the TV networksprot given by the expression
25In e¤ect, the option of returning the DVR removes any uncertainty about which equilibrium is
played. We could also simply have assumed that when a price which belongs to several equilibria
is played, the equilibrium preferred by the DVR seller is realized. The explanation is that if it was
not realized, the DVR seller would have been better o¤ by setting a higher price.
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in Table 2, and the advertisers prot given by Eq. (2), and then compere the
expressions to when we do the same for  = 0, we nd that;
Proposition 5: Compared to when the DVR technology is not available, when
it is supplied by a monopoly rm;
a) the TV networks are better o¤;
b) the viewers as a group are worse o¤, and;
c) the advertisers are worse o¤ .26
The DVR supplier always supplies more DVRs than that which maximizes the
TV networksprot, i.e. TV < . However, the number of DVRs sold in equi-
librium will not be su¢ ciently high to make the TV networks worse o¤ compared
to when the DVR technology is not available.27 The viewers as a group, however,
are always worse o¤ compared to when the technology is not available. The reason
is that the adopterscost of buying the DVR technology reduces the adoptersnet
private benet to such an extent that the aggregate private benet never exceeds
the negative externalities which are imposed on the non-adopters. Furthermore,
the DVR penetration is always so high that the advertisement price in equilibrium
does not decrease su¢ ciently to compensate the advertisers for the loss of viewers
exposed to their ads.
4 Concluding Remarks:
The aim of this paper is to theoretically investigate the consequences of that the
viewers today can adopt technology which enables them to avoid the advertisements
that interrupt TV programs. We do this in a model where a monopoly TV network
26In a previous version of the paper, we allowed for the TV network by investing in program
quality being able to boost the demand for TV programs. Apart from the fact that the quality
level turned out to follow the shape of the TV networks prot level, all but one result survived
when we removed the quality investments. This result that did not hold was that for low values
of  the advertisers were better o¤ when a monopoly supplied the ad-avoidance technology than
when the technology was not available.
27This result holds when  < 0:47:
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serves viewers that are heterogenous in their aversion towards advertising. The nd-
ings are perhaps somewhat surprising, inasmuch as we nd that both the TV network
and the advertisers may benet from the DVR technology enabling the viewers to
avoid the advertisements by incurring a xed cost. Even more surprisingly may be
the result that when we take into account the viewerscosts of adopting the DVR
technology, the viewers as a group are always worse o¤when the technology is avail-
able. Furthermore, we nd that the social surplus is always higher when a monopoly
rm supplies the DVR technology than when the technology is unavailable. The rst
and the latter of our results are in stark contrast to what Anderson & Gans (2011),
henceforth A&G, nd when they consider a TV network which is free-to-air. They
show that the prot of the TV network, as well as the social surplus, decreases even
when the most ad-averse viewers adopt the DVR technology. 28
All through the paper we make two simplifying assumptions which are worth
commenting on. The TV network is a monopoly and it sells programs in a pay-per-
view fashion. However, all qualitative results carry over to a model where di¤eren-
tiated TV networks compete. The pay-per-view approach is chosen such that we
can tractable derive each viewers demand for TV programs and aggregate this up
to a total demand. This enables us to capture a relationship which is not captured
in A&G; the more averse towards advertising a viewer is, the less programs he con-
sumes when he is exposed to advertising and hence the less advertising revenue is
foregone if he adopts the DVR technology. We believe that the di¤erent ndings
of our paper, relative to those of A&G, are driven by the fact that we, in contrast
to A&G, capture this relationship, and not the fact that A&G has a di¤erent mod-
elling approach, i.e. in A&G the TV network charges a subscription fee. The reason
is that the driving mechanism of our results, i.e. that the DVR technology opens
for possibility that the most and the least advertising averse viewers can be served
more e¢ ciently, applies also to a subscription based business model. The di¤erence
is simply that the TV network will then increase the subscription fee instead of
increasing the program price, in order to internalize that the viewers obtain higher
utility/consumes more TV programs when they are shielded from advertising.
28A&G also nd this when they consider subscription based TV.
26
SNF Working Paper No 17/12
TV signal providers play no role in our simple model, thus the TV network is
assumed to set the end-user price and the DVR supplier is assumed to have no
relationship with the TV network. However, as discussed in Kind et. al (2010)
and Bergh et al. (2012), the end-user price is usually set by a TV signal provider.
Furthermore, most viewers do not buy a DVR box from an independent rm as in
our extension, but rent or buy it from TV signal providers. This complicates the
picture as it means that the same rm sets both the DVR price and the price for
watching TV. Moreover, when the TV signal providers can supply their customers
with DVR technology, the bargaining power of the parties may be a¤ected. In
turn this may impact the contracts between the TV networks and the TV signal
providers. We therefore conclude that our paper, together with A&G, sheds some
light on the role of the DVR technology, but more research is needed to complete
the picture. Further research should therefore attempt to incorporate the role of
TV-signal providers.
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5 Appendix
A1: Proof of Lemma 1.
Part a)
@A
@p
r =   r
2    + 1 < 0
28
SNF Working Paper No 17/12
Part b)
 @D1
@A
p =
1
2
(1  ) (1   + 2) p
The revenue from the advertiser side of the market decreases in the program
price and the revenue from the viewer side of the market decrases in the advertising
sales. Q.E.D.
A2: Derivation of Equilibrium Values, Table 1.
The TV-networks F.O.Cs with respect to the prices are:
@
@p
=
1
2
(1  2) (1  2p)  2 ((1 + )(r   (1  2p))) + 4r
1 + 2    = 0
@
@r
=
2((1 + p) (1  ))  p(1  2)  8r
(1  ) (2    + 1) = 0
By solving the system of equations we obtain:
p = 2
1  2 + 2(3 + )
Z 1
(11)
r =
(1 + ) (1   + 2) (3   + 2)
((1  )Z) 1 (12)
where:
Z =
 
(7  ) (1  2) + 4(5   + (4  (   ))) 1
The optimal advertising level is found by substituting into Eq. (??) for Eqs (11)
and(12), we obtain:
A =
2 (1 +    2)
Z 1
A3: Proof of Proposition 1.
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@r
@
=  16
3((1 + (   2))   (22   9   4))
2Z 2
  8 2 (10 +  (3
3   222   4 + 30) + 25)
2Z 2
   56    (232 + 2 (24   (42  4)))
2Z 2
   ( (
4   143 + 232 + 28   49)  14) + 25 + 148
2Z 2
< 0
@r
@
= 2
(1  2) 4 (5 + ( + 7)  ( + 4)) +  (2 +    1)  1
Z 2
> 0
@A
@
= 8
2 (2 + 2 (1 +  2 ( + 3  2))) + 5 (   2) +  +  (7  2)
Z 2
> 0
@A
@
=  817(1 + )  4 (1  (1  )  
2)  2(1 + )
Z 2
< 0
@p
@
= 4 (1  ) 11 + 4 (1 + ( + 3)  
2) +  (7 + (   3))
Z 2
> 0
@p
@
= 2
1 + 2 (2   2) + 4 (1  15   8 2 +  (13   (5 + ) +  (14 + )))
Z2
? 0
All numerators, except from the the numerater of @p=@, are positive for all dened
combinations of  and  .
If we evaluate the numerator of @p=@ for  = 0, we obtain  32 3   60 2 +
4 + 1 ? 0, and if we evaluate it for  = 1 we obtain 32   32 3 > 0. The former
expression is negative if   1=6. Q.E.D.
A4: roof of Proposition 2.
By substituting into Eq. (4) for p, r and A, we obtain:
 = 2 ( + 1)
2    + 1
Z 1
By taking derivatives of , we obtain:
@
@
=  4 (1  ) ( + 1) (3 + 2   ) 1 +    2
Z 2
< 0 (13)
@
@
= 2
1   (1 +  (1  )) +  (8 (   ) + 2 (1  2))
(1 +    2) 1 Z 2 7 0 (14)
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@2
@@
=  810   (18 +  (98 + 36   28
2 + 103   64))
Z 3
  8 2 (84  72
2   124) +  3 (72 + 16 +  (24 + 24 + 82   16))
Z 3
  8 (15  9   18
2 + 34   5)
Z 3
< 0
Eq. (13) is negative for all dened combinations of  and  . If we evaluate the last
term of Eq. (14) for  = 0 we obtain:
1 + 2 (1 + 4) > 0
Since the last term is positive for  = 0, the full expression is positive around zero.
If we evaluate the last term for  = 1 we obtain:
8 (   1) < 0
Since the last term is negative for  = 1, the full expression is negative around
 = 1. Hence, if the function is well behaved in , there exists a value TV for which
the prot of the TV network is maximized. Finally since @2=@@ < 0, it follws
that the optimal @TV =@ < 0
A5: Proof of Proposition 3.
a) The equilibrium consumer surplus is given by:
CS = U +
Z +(1 )

UdC =
=
49 +  (2  101   42 + 553 + 24   35)
6Z 2
+ 
188 + 196 +  (200 + 348 + 48 3+)
6Z 2
  2 168 + 224 + 20
2   243
6Z 2
+ 2 2
228 + 68   722   96 + 96   48 2
6Z 2
We can now do comparative statics by taking derviatives of CS with repsect to 
and  . Starting with , we obtain:
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@CS
@
=
2
3
28 +  (118 + 339 + 274 2   108 3 + 24 4)
(Z3 (1 +    2)) 1
  2
3
 (38 + 46   762   83 + 384   105)
(Z3 (1 +    2)) 1
  2
3
 (238 + 316   4282   703 + 624)
(Z3 (1 +    2)) 1
  2
3
 2 (86 +  (1404  246   1372))
(Z3 (1 +    2)) 1
+
2
3
 3 (1026  594   1302 +  (60 + 240  24))
(Z3 (1 +    2)) 1
If we evaluate @CS=@ for  = 0 and  = 1 we can show that:
@CS
@
j =0 = 2
3 (7  4 (   5)) (1  2)
 
28 + 
 
118 + 339 + 274 2   108 3 + 24 4 > 0
@CS
@
j =1 =  8 (1  )2  (4 + ) < 0
Hence, CS is hump-shaped for all dened values of  . Now, the derivative of CS
with respect to  is:
@C
@
=
2
3
(1  ) 161 + + (109  258   90
2 + 973   194)
((2      1)Z3) 1 +
2
3
(1  )  (380 + 716   108
2   3323 + 1124)
((2      1)Z3) 1 +
2
3
(1  ) 
2 (196 + 636 + 1562   2203 +  (240 + 144))
((2      1)Z3) 1 < 0
The expression is negative for all dened combinations of  and  .
The equilibrium prot for the advertisers is:
B =
2 (1  ) (1   + 2)
((1 +    2)Z) 2
By taking deriatives of B with respect to , we obtain:
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@B
@
=
1 +  (5   (50  52 + 142   73))
(4 (1 +    2)) 1 Z 3
+
 2 (66   (158  46 + 182))
(4 (1 +    2)) 1 Z 3  
 (1 + 2   22   3 + 4)
(4 (1 +    2)) 1 Z 3
+
 3 (92  48 + 202    (8   8))
(4 (1 +    2)) 1 Z 3
If we evaluate @B=@ for  = 0 and  = 1, we can show that:
@B
@
j =0 = 4 1  2
(7 + 20   4 2)3
 
1 + 
 
5 + 66 + 92 2 + 8 3

> 0
@B
@
j =1 =   1
64
(1  )2 < 0
Hence, B is hump shaped in .
If we take take the derivative of B with respect to  we obtain:
@B
@
=  4 (1  ) (3   + 2) 9 +    9
2   3 + 12 + 4 2 + 16 + 42   4 2
((1 +    2)Z3) 1 < 0
The last fraction is positive for all dened combinations of  and  .Q.E.D.
b)
In order to show that B < CS < TV we choose any arbritrary  and solve for
the optimal DVR penetration for the di¤erent agents. By doing so for  = 0:05
and  = 0:35 we obtain;
 = 0:05  = 0:35
@=@ = 0 TV = 0:662 81 TV = 0:600 84
@CS=@ = 0 CS = 0:638 62 CS = 0:598 31
@B=@ = 0 B = 0:435 62 B = 0:505 21
Q.E.D.
A6: Proof of Lemma 5.
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The F.O.C. is:
@ 
@
=
28 +  (115  49   512 2   216 3 + 144 4   16 5)
2 1Z 3
   10 + 84   30
2   843 + 304 + 285   106
2 1Z 3
+  2
1109  102   19542 + 1113 + 2854   85
2 1Z 3
+  3
660 + 2460   6202   4763 + 244
2 1Z 3
   4 1088  600   416
2 + 323 +  (192  16)
2 1Z 3
+ 
209  579   2972 + 5493 + 874   855 + 6    4 (96  48)
2 1Z 3
= 0
By substituting parameter values for  into @ =@ = 0 we obtain:
 = 0:5  = 0:2  = 0:35
 = 0:816 09 0:833 55 0:926 78
P  = 0:109 46 6: 231 1 10 2 4: 103 0 10 2
Hence, the higher the disutility of advertising the higher DVR penetration and
the lower price. Q.E.D.
A7: Proof of Proposition 5.
Dene  = ()   (0), where  = ; B; CS : A positive  indicates
therefore that the agents are better o¤ when the technology is available, while a
negative  indicates that they are worse o¤.
 = 0:05  = 0:2  = 0:35
 1: 244 8 10 2 0:002 43 0:000 66
CS  2: 505 5 10 2  2: 373 6 10 2  0:026 44
B  3: 961 5 10 3  2: 472 7 10 3  4: 544 10 4
  8: 933 0 10 2 5: 193 9 10 2 3: 802 5 10 2
The proof follows from the table. Q.E.D.
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The business model of many commercial TV-networks is to interrupt TV programs 
with advertising breaks. In this paper we investigate consequences of the fact 
that ad-averse viewers today can adopt technology which enables them to skip 
the advertising breaks. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we find that the ad-avoid-
ance technology can make TV networks and the advertisers better off. The view-
ers as a group however, are always worse off when we take into account their 
costs associated with adopting the technology.
